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The Instriimentalism of John Dewey

The approach of John Dewey to philosophy, while influenced
by many of the same factors which were important to Russell, and
despite his agreement with Russell on many social issues, takes
a radically different direction»
Dewey sees a person's philosophy
as more intimately and internally related to the social processes
than does Russell. Instead of viewing it as primarily a means of
analysis and clarification, Dewey sees the role of philosophy as
a method of social reconstruction, and logic as a method of inqu
iry rather than a means of exploring the implications of analyt
ical definitions and empirical facts»
It is therefore not surprising
that his categories for dealing with different philosophies are
conservative and progressive, rather than critical and constructive
or idealistic and materialistic. How he arrived at his instrumen
talist philosophy can best be understood by tracing briefly his
own long intellectual jpilgrimage,
John Dewey (1859-1952) was born of middle-class Puritan
stock in Vermont, and educated at that state's university. Gradu
ating at an early age he went to The Johns Hopkins University,
then recently established to provide advanced study for American
students„ Here he came under the influence of Hegelian thought,
which provided him witii what appeared to be an intellectually
respectable synthesis of his current religious and philosophical
interests, much as it had for Russell and others. While Dewey was
later to reject much of Hegelianism, he never lost the demand for
• Reprinted from Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic and
Other Essays (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,1910), pp.
46-57, Used with permission.
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insistence on the importance of social
were two of its major contributions.
dealt with the psychology of Kant,
to be of great importance for his

While he was teaching at the University of Michigan (18841888, 1889-1894), two major interests undermined his Hegelian
ism. First, the more practical emphases of Kant led him to
reject rational idealism's interpretation of Mind as a consti
tutive and determinative factor in the universe. Second, the
psychology of William James tended to confirm this conclusion.
But Dewey did not enter the camp of the materialists. Rather,
he began to see mind as a biologically grounded instrument of
the interaction between the person and his environment. Mind
evolves just aSj, according to Darwin, any other part of the
human organism evolves. Its special role is that of participant
rather than either spectator or dictator in man's social evolu
tion, Such an interpretation of mind had the further advantage
of being open to objective, public, and scientific study. The
combination of these ethical and psychological interests explains
Dewey's lifelong emphasis on the close relationship between
philosophy on the one hand and biology and psychology on the
other.
In 1894 Dewey began teaching philosophy at the University
of Chicago, where he was also responsible for psychology and peda
gogy, Here were brought to full bloom his interests in education
through contacts with teachers and the Laboratory School, a
private experimental venture. Here what came to be called progress
ive education was launched. Also Dewey met Jane Addams (1860-1935),
the founder and operator of Hull House, the famous settlement
house. As a result of this relationship he became more involved
in the social problems of large industrial cities. The arbitrary
absorption of the Laboratory School by the university brought the
resignation of Dewey and others (1904), and it was only through
the help of friends that he was able to obtain another academic
appointment,
From 1904 until his retirement in 1930 Dewey was the out
standing teacher of Columbia University's philosophy department.
Here, under the influence of his new colleagues and environment,
his philosophical and political thought matured and received its
most complete expression. He shed his earlier liberal optimism
for a more radical liberalism which called for the application of
political democracy to the realms of economic theory and practice.
During these years he wrote such books as Reconstruction in Philo
sophy (lectures at the Imperial University in Tokyo, published in
1920), The Quest for Certainty (the Gifford Lecture, published in
1929), and Art as Experience (1934), While his literary style
never rivaled Russell's, each book resembling a detailed discussion
of all of the factors involved in the problem at hand, innumerable
writings flowed from his pen and were translated into every major
modern language. From his position at Columbia he influenced an
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ever-widening circle of people, directly and indirectly, by his
teaching, writing, speaking, and personal contacts.
Dewey's philosophy, like Russell's, is thoroughly natural
istic, rejecting transcendent absolutes of all sorts, and also
antimetaphysical. Unlike Russell, however, he makes a sustained
attempt at synthesis. But this attempt is made in terms of
method rather than in terms of metaphysics. And his instrumental
method, as Dewey called it, has two unique features. , It is, on
the one hand, an attempt to apply Dewey's interpretation of the
scientific method to the human and social areas. By viewing
scientific ideas practically, instead of theoretically, Dewey
would unite the scientific and ethical strivings of men, while
at the same time avoiding any absolutes. Since scientific and
all other ideas are but means for change, he suggests that it
is possible to treat them as instrumental ideas, rather than as
universals or finalities. On the other hand, since all such
ideas receive their validation from within the realm of evolving
human experience, he claims that such a method is itself incapable
of becoming absolute, but is rather a continually self-correcting
tool. It is only by viewing philosophy this way, as an everreconstructed method, that men will be able to solve their social
and cultural problems, and at the same time preserve their demo
cratic tradition.
The selection which follows, "The Influence of Darwinism on
Philosophy," was written during Dewey's Columbia period (1909).
It is one of the most clearly written of his works, and represents
many of his important points as well as his attitude toward
philosophy as a whole.
I
That the publication of the "Origin of Species" marked
an epoch in the development of the natural sciences is well
known to the layman. That the combination of the very words,
origin and species embodied an intellectual revolt and
introduced a new intellectual temper is easily overlooked
by the expert. The conceptions that had reigned in the philo
sophy of nature and knowledge for two thousand years, the
conceptions that had become the familiar furniture of the
mind, rested on the assumption of the superiority of the
fixed and final; they rested upon treating change and origin
as signs of defect and unreality. In laying hands upon the
sacred ark of absolute permanency, in treating the forms
that had been regarded as types of fixity and perfection as
originating and passing away, the 'Origin of Species" intro
duced a mode of thinking that in the end was bound to trans
form the logic of knowledge, and hence the treatment of
morals, politics, and religion.
No wonder, then, that the publication of Darwin's book,
a half century aeco, precipitated a crisis. The true nature
of the controversv is easily concealed from us, however, by
the theological clamor that attended it. The vivid and
popular features of the anti-Darwinian row tended to leave
the impression that the issue was between science on one side
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and theology on the other. Such was not the case — the issue
lay primarily within science itself, as Darwin himself early
recognized. The theological outcry he discounted from the
start, hardly noticing it save as it bore upon the "feelings
of his female relatives." But for two decades before final
publication he contemplated the possibility of being put
down by his scientific peers as a fool or as crazy; and he
set, as the measure of his success, the degree in which he
should affect three men of science: Lyell in geology. Hooker
in botany, and Huxley in zoology.
Religious considerations lent fervor to the controversy,
but they did not provoke it. Intellectually, religious emotions
are not creative but conservative. They attach themselves
readily to the current view of the world and consecrate it.
They steep and dye intellectual fabrics in the seething
vat of emotions; they do not form their warp and woof.
There is not, I think, an instance of any large idea about
the world being independently generated by religion. Although
the ideas that rose up like armed men against Darwinism
owed their intensity to religious associations, their origin
and meaning are to be sought in science and philosophy,
not in religion.

I
1

i

II
Few words in our language foreshorten intellectual his
tory as much as does the word species. The Greeks, in initiating
the intellectual life of Europe, were impressed by character
istic traits of the life of plants and animals; so impressed
indeed that they made these traits the key to defining nature
and to explaining mind and society. And truly, life is so
wonderful that a seemingly successful reading of its mystery
might well lead men to believe that the key to the secrets of
heaven and earth was in their hands. The Greek rendering of
this mystery, the Greek formulation of the aim and standard
of knowledge, was in the course of time embodied in the word
species, and it controlled philosophy for two thousand years.
To understand the intellectual face-about expressed in the
phrase "Origin of Species," we must, then, understand the long
dominant idea against which it is a protest.
Consider how men were impressed by the facts of life.
Their eyes fell upon certain things slight in bulk, and frail
in structure. To every appearance, these perceived things were
inert and passive. Suddenly, under certain circumstances,
these things — henceforth known as seeds or eggs or germs -begin to change, to change rapidly in size, form, and qualities.
Rapid and extensive changes occur, however, in many things —
as when wood is touched by fire. But the changes in the
living thing are orderly; they are cumulative; they tend con
stantly in one direction; they do not, like other changes,
destroy or consume, or pass fruitless into wandering flux;
they realize and fulfil. Each successive stage, no matter
how unlike its predecessor, preserves its net effect and also
prepares the way for a fuller activity on the part of its sucQessor. In living beings, changes do not happen as they seem
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to happen elsewhere, any which way; the earlier changes are
regulated in view of later results. This progressive organization
does not cease till there is achieved a true final term..,a
completed, perfected end. This final form exercises in turn a
plenitude of functions, not the least noteworthy of which is
production of germs like those from which it took its own
origin, germs capable of the same cycle of self-fulfilling
activity„
But the whole miraculous tale is not yet told. The same
drama is enacted to the same destiny in countless myriads of
individuals so sundered in time, so severed in space, that
they have no opportunity for mutual consultation and no means
of interaction. As an old writer quaintly said, "things of
the same kind go through the same formalities" — celebrate,
as it were, the same ceremonial rites.
This formal activity which operates throughout a series
of changes and holds them to a single course; which subord
inates their aimless flux to its own perfect manifestation;
which, leaping the boundaries of s^pace and time, keeps indiv
iduals distant in space and remote in time to a uniform type
of structure and function; this principle seemed to give
insight into the very nature of reality itself. To it
Aristotle gave the name [which] the scholastics translated
as species.
The force of this term is deepened by its application
to everything in the universe that observes order in flux and
manifests constancy through change. From the casual drift
of daily weather, through the uneven recurrence of seasons
and unequal return of seed time and harvest, up to the maj
estic sweep of the heavens — the image of eternity in time
— and from this to the unchanging pure and contemplative
intelligence beyond nature lies one unbroken fulfilment of
ends. Nature as a whole is a progressive realization of
purpose strictly comparable to the realization of purpose in
any single plant or animal.
The concepcxon ofspecies, a fixed form and final
cause, was the central principle of knowledge as well as of
nature. Upon it rested the logic of science. Change as change
is mere flux and lapse; it insults intelligence. Genuinely
to know is to grasp a permanent end that realizes itself
through changes, holding them thereby within the metes and
bounds of fixed truth. Completely to know is to relate all
special forms to their one single end and good: pure contem
plative intelligence. Since, however, the scene of nature
which directly confronts us is in change, nature as directly
and practically experienced does not satisfy the conditions
of knowledge. Human experience is in flux, and hence the
instrumentalities of sense-perception and of inference based
upon observation are condemned in advance. Science is com
pelled to aim at realities lying behind and beyond the pro-.
cesses of nature, and to carry on its search for these
realities by means of rational forms transcending ordinary
modes of perception and inference,,
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There are, indeed, but two alternative courses. We must
either find the appropriate objects and organs of knowledge
in the mutual interactions of changing things; or else, to
escape the infection of change, we must seek them in some
transcendent and supernal region. The human mind, deliber
ately as it were, exhausted the logic of the changeless, the
final, and the transcendent, before it essayed adventure on
the pathless wastes of generation and transformation. We
dispose all too easily of the efforts of the schoolmen to
interpret nature and mind in terms of real essences, hidden
forms, and occult faculties, forgetful of the seriousness
and dignity of the ideas that lay behind. We dispose of
them by laughing at the famous gentleman who accounted for
the fact that opium put people to sleep on the ground it had
a dormitive faculty. But the doctrine, held in our own day,
that knowledge of the plant that yields the poppy consists
in referring the peculiarities of an individual to a type,
to a universal form, a doctrine so firmly established that
any other method of knowing was conceived to be unphilosophical and unscientific, is a survival of precisely the
same logic. This identity of conception in the scholastic
and anti-Darwinian theory may well suggest greater sympathy
for what has become unfamiliar as well as greater humility
regarding the further unfamiliarities that history has in
store,
Darwin was not, of course, the first to question the
classic philosophy of nature and of knowledge. The begin
nings of the revolution are in the physical science of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. When Galileo said:
"It is my opinion that the earth is very noble and admir
able by reason of so many and so different alterations and
generations which are incessantly made therein," he expressed
the changed temper that was coming over the world; the
transfer of interest from the permanent to the changing.
When Descartes said: "The nature of physical things is much
more easily conceived when they are beheld coming gradually
into existence, thkn when they are only considered as
produced at once in a finished and perfect state," the
modern world became self-conscious of the logic that was
henceforth to control it, the logic of which Darwin's "Origin
of Species" is the latest scientific achievement. Without
the methods of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and their suc
cessors in astronomy, physics, and chemistry, Darwin would
have been helpless in the organic sciences. But prior to
Darwin the impact of the new scientific method upon life,
mind, and politics, had been arrested, because between these
ideal or moral interests and the inorganic world intervened
the kingdom of plants and animals. The gates of the garden
of life were barred to the new ideas; and only through this
garden was there access to mind and politics. The influence
of Darwin upon philosophy resides in his having conquered the
phenomena of life for the principle of transition, and thereby
freed the new logic for application to mind and morals and
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life. When he said of species what Galileo had said of the
earth.oohe emancipated, once for all, genetic and experi
mental ideas as an organon of asking questions and looking
for explanations.
Ill
The exact bearings upon philosophy of the new logical
outlook are, of course, as yet, uncertain and inchoate. We
live in the twilight of intellectual transition. One must
add the rashness of the prophet to the stubbornness of the
partizan to venture a systematic exposition of the influence
upon philosophy of the Darwinian method. At best, we can but
inquire as to its general bearing — the effect upon mental
temper and complexion, upon that body of half-conscious,
half-instinctive intellectual aversions and preferences which
determine, after all, our more deliberate intellectual enter
prises. In this vague inquiry there happens to exist as a
kind of touchstone a problem of long historic currency that
has also been much discussed in Darwinian literature. I
refer to the old problem of design versus chance, mind versus
matter, as the causal explanation, first"~or final, of things.
As we have already seen, the classic notion of species
carried with it the idea of purpose. In all living forms, a
specific type is present directing the earlier stages of
growth to the realization of its own perfection. Since this
purposive regulative principle is not visible to the senses,
it follows that it must be an ideal or rational force. Since,
however, the perfect form is gradually approximated through
the sensible changes, it also follows that in and through a
sensible realm a rational ideal force is working out its
own ultimate manifestation. These inferences were extended to
nature: (a) She does nothing in vain; but all for an ulterior
purpose. (b) Within natural sensible events there is therefore
contained a spiritual causal force, which as spiritual escapes
perception, but is apprehended by an enlightened reason. (c)
The manifestation of this principle brings about a subordin
ation of matter and sense to its own realization, and this
ultimate fulfilment is the goal of nature and of man. The
design argument thus operated in two directions. Purposefulness accounted for the intelligibility of nature and the
possibility of science, while the absolute or cosmic character
of this purposefulness gave sanction and worth to the moral
and religious endeavors of man. Science was underpinned and
morals authorized by one and the same principle, and their
mutual agreement was eternally guaranteed.
This philosophy remained, in spite of sceptical and
polemic outbursts, the official and the regnant philosophy of
Europe for over two thousand years. The expulsion of fixed
first and final causes from astronomy, physics, and chemistry
had indeed given the doctrine something of a shock. But, on
the other hand, increased acquaintance with the details of
plant and animal life operated as a counterbalance and perhaps
even strengthened the argument from design. The marvelous
adaptation of organisms to their environment, of organs to
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the organism, of unlike parts of a complex organ — like the
eye — to the organ itself; the foreshadowing by lower forms
of the higher; the preparation in earlier stages of growth
for organs that only later had their functioning — these
things were increasingly recognized with the progress of
botany, zoology, palaeontology, and embryology. Together,
they added such prestige to the design argument that by the
late eighteenth century it was, as approved by the sciences
of organic life, the central point of theistic and idealistic
philosophy.
The Darwinian principle of natural selection cut
straight under this philosophy. If all organic adaptations
are due simply to constant variation and the elimination of
those variations which are harmful in the struggle for exis
tence that is brought about by excessive reproduction, there
is no call for a prior intelligent causal force to plan and
preordain them. Hostile critics charged Darwin with material
ism and with making chance the cause of the universe.
Some naturalists, like Asa Gray, favored the Darwinian
principle and attempted to reconcile it with design. Gray held
to what may be called design on the installment plan. If we
conceive the "stream of variations" to be itself intended, we
may suppose that each successive variation was designed from
the first to be selected. In that case, variation, struggle,
and selection simply define the mechanism of "secondary
causes" through which the "first cause" acts; and the doctrine
of design is none the worse off because we know more of its
modus operandi.
Darwin could not accept this mediating proposal. He
admits or rather he asserts that it is "impossible to conceive
this immense and wonderful universe including man with his
capacity of looking far backwards and far into futurity as the
result of blind chance or necessity." But nevertheless he holds
that since variations are in useless as well as useful directions,
and since the latter are sifted out simply by the stress of the
conditions of struggle for existence, the design argument as
applied to living beings is unjustifiable; and its lack of sup
port there deprives it of scientific value as applied to nature
in general. If the variations of the pigeon, which under selec
tion give the pouter pigeon, are not preordained for the sake
of the breeder, by what logic do we argue that variations
resulting in natural species are pre-designed?
IV
So much for some of the more obvious facts of the dis
cussion of design versus chance, as causal principles of nature
and of life as a whole. We brought up this discussion, you re
call, as a crucial instance. What does our touchstone indicate
as to the bearing of Darwinian ideas upon philosophy? In the
first place, the new logic outlaws, flanks, dismisses — what
you will — one type of problems and substitutes for it another
type. Philosophy forswears inquiry after absolute origins and
absolute finalities in order to explore specific values and the
specific conditions that generate them.
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Darwin concluded that the impossibility of assigning the
world to chance as a whole and to design in its parts indic
ated the insolubility of the question. Two radically different
reasons, however, may be given as to why a problem is insoluble.
One reason is that the problem is too high for intelligence;
the other is that the question in its very asking makes assum
ptions that render the question meaningless. The latter alter
native is unerringly pointed to in the celebrated case of
design versus chance. Once admit that the sole verifiable or
fruitful object of knowledge is the particular set of changes
that generate the object of study together with the consequences
that then flow from it, and no intelligible question can be
asked about what, by assumption, lies outside. To assert — as
is often asserted — that specific values of particular truth,
social bonds and forms of beauty, if they can be shown to be
generated by concretely knowable conditions, are meaningless
and in vain; to assert that they are justified only when they
and their particular causes and effects have all at once been
gathered up into some inclusive first cause and some exhaustive
final goal, is intellectual atavism.' Such argumentation is
reversion to the logic that explained the extinction of fire
by water through the formal essence of aqueousness and the
quenching of thirst by water through the final cause of aque
ousness. Whether used in the case of the special event or that
of life as a whole, such logic only abstracts some aspect of
the existing course of events in order to reduplicate it as a
petrified eternal principle by which to explain the very changes
of which it is the formalizatioUo
When Henry Sidgwick casually remarked in a letter that
as he grew older his interest in what or who made the world
was altered into interest in what kind of a world it is any
way, his voicing of a common experience of our own day illustrates
also the nature of that intellectual transformation effected
by the Darwinian logic. Interest shifts from the wholesale
essence back of special changes to the question of how special
changes serve and defeat concrete purposes; shifts from an
intelligence that shaped things once for all to the particular
intelligence which things are even now shaping; shifts from
an ultimate goal of good to the direct increments of justice
and happiness that intelligent administration of existent
conditions may beget and that present carelessness or stupidity
will destroy or forego.
In the second place, the classic type of logic inevitably
set philosophy upon proving that life must have certain qualit
ies and values — no matter how experience presents the matter —
because of some remote cause and eventual goal. The duty of
wholesale justification inevitably accompanies all thinking
that makes the meaning of special occurrences depend upon some
thing that once and for all lies behind them. The habit of
derogating from present meanings and uses prevents our looking
the facts of experience in the face; it prevents seriotls acknow
ledgment of the evils they present and serious concern with the
goods they promise but do not as yet fulfil. It turns thought to
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the business of finding a wholesale transcendent remedy for
the one and guarantee for the other. One is reminded of the
way many moralists and theologians greeted Herbert Spencer's
recognition of an unknowable energy from which welled up the
phenomenal physical processes without and the conscious opera
tions within. Merely because Spencer labeled his unknowable
energy "God," this faded piece of metaphysical goods was
greeted as an important and grateful concession to the reality
of the spiritual realm. Were it not for the deep hold of the
habit of seeking justification for ideal values in the remote
and transcendent, surely this reference of them to an unknow
able absolute would be despised in comparison with the demon
strations of experience that knowable energies are daily
generating about us precious values.
The displacing of this wholesale type of philosophy
will doubtless not arrive by sheer logical disproof, but rather
by growing recognition of its futility. Were it a thousand
times true that opium produces sleep because of its dormitive
energy, yet the inducing of sleep in the tired, and the
recovery to waking life of the poisoned, would not be thereby
one least step forwarded. And were it a thousand times dialectically demonstrated that life as a whole is regulated by
a transcendent principle to a final inclusive goal, none the
less truth and error, health and disease, good and evil, hope
and fear in the concrete, would remain just what and where
they now are. To improve our education, to ameliorate our
manners, to advance our politics, we must have recourse to
specific conditions of generation.
Finally, the new logic introduces responsibility into the
intellectual life. To idealize and rationalize the universe
at large is after all a confession of inability to master the
courses of things that specifically concern us. As long as
mankind suffered from this impotency, it naturally shifted
a burden of responsibility that it could not carry over to
the more competent shoulders of the transcendent cause. But
if insight into specific conditions of value and into specific
consequences of ideas is possible, philosophy must in time
become a method locating and interpreting the more serious
of the conflicts that occur in life, and a method of projecting
ways for dealing with them; a method of moral and political
diagnosis and prognosis.
The claim to formulate a priori the legislative consti
tution of the universe is by its nature a claim that may lead
to elaborate dialectic developments. But it is also one that
removes these very conclusions from subjection to experimental
test, for, by definition, these results make no differences in
the detailed course of events. But a philosophy that humbles
its pretensions to the work of projecting hypotheses for the
education and conduct of mind, individual and social, is
thereby subjected to test by the way in which the ideas it
propounds work out in practice. In having modesty forced upon
it, philosophy also acquires responsibility.
Doubtless I seem to have violated the implied promise of
my earlier remarks and to have turned both prophet and partizan.
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But in anticipating the direction of the transformations
in philosophy to be wrought by the Darwinian genetic and
experimental logic, I do not profess to speak for any save
those who yield themselves consciously or unconsciously to
this logic. No one can fairly deny that at present there are
two effects of the Darwinian mode of thinking. On the one
hand, there are making many sincere and vital efforts to
revise our traditional philosophic conceptions in accordance
with its demands. On the other hand, there is as definitely
a recrudescence of absolutistic philosophies; an assertion
of a type of philosophic knowing distinct from that of the
sciences, one which opens to us another kind of reality from
that to which the sciences give access; an appeal through
experience to something that essentially goes beyond exper
ience. This reaction affects popular creeds and religious
movements as well as technical philosophies. The very con
quest of the biological sciences by the new ideas has led
many to proclaim an explicit and rigid separation of philo
sophy from science.
Old ideas give way slowly; for they are more than abstract
logical forms and categories. They are habits, predispositions,
deeply engrained attitudes of aversion and preference. More
over, the conviction persists — though history shows it to be
a hallucination — that all the questions that the human mind
has asked are questions that can be answered in terms of the
alternatives that the questions themselves present. But in
fact intellectual progress usually occurs through sheer aban
donment of questions together with both of the alternatives
they assume — an abandonment that results from their decreasing
vitality and a change of urgent interest. We do not solve
them: we get over them. Old questions are solved by dis
appearing, evaporating, while new questions corresponding to
the changed attitude of endeavor and preference take their place.
Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in contemporary thought of
old questions, the greatest precipitant of new methods, new
intentions, new problems, is the one effected by the scientific
revolution that found its climax in the "Origin of Species."*

3.

Whitehead's Philosophical Synthesis

In Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) we meet a philosopher
who was born an Englishman and died an American, and whose thought"
combined the major recent philosophical contributions of both
countries in a radically new and startling metaphysical synthesis.
Unlike both Dewey and Russell, he sees in philosophy neither the
* John Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other
Essays in Contemporary ThougTfE (New YorE: Henry Holt and Company,
1910), pp. 1-19
Used with permission.

